

Placement Director: Daniele Coen-Pirani  
Graduate Administrator: Lauree Graham

COEN@PITT.EDU 412-648-1749  
LAUREE@PITT.EDU 412-648-8745

4515 W.W. Posvar Hall  
Department of Economics  
University of Pittsburgh  
230 S. Bouquet St.  
Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA

Office: 412-648-1744  
Cell: 412-390-4083  
E-mail: SUK36@PITT.EDU  
<http://sites.google.com/site/yhvh0826>

**DATE OF BIRTH** August 26<sup>th</sup> 1973 **SEX** Male **CITIZENSHIP** Korea (F-1 Visa)

### **GRADUATE STUDIES**

University of Pittsburgh, 2006-present  
Thesis Title: “Essays in Political Economy”  
Expected Completion Date: August 2012

### **REFERENCES**

John Duffy	Andreas Blume	Sourav Bhattacharya
Professor, Director of PEEL	Professor	Assistant Professor
Department of Economics	Department of Economics	Department of Economics
University of Pittsburgh	University of Pittsburgh	University of Pittsburgh
4929 Posvar Hall	4932 Posvar Hall	4528 Posvar Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260	Pittsburgh, PA 15260	Pittsburgh, PA 15260
Phone: 412-648-1733	Phone: 412-648-7088	Phone: 412-383-8166
Email: <a href="mailto:jduffy@pitt.edu">jduffy@pitt.edu</a>	Email: <a href="mailto:ablume@pitt.edu">ablume@pitt.edu</a>	Email: <a href="mailto:sourav@pitt.edu">sourav@pitt.edu</a>

### **EDUCATION**

Sunkyunkwan University, M.A. in Economics, 2004-2006  
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, M.A. in International Area Studies, 2000-2002  
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, B.A. in English Language and Literature, 1992-1998

### **TEACHING AND RESEARCH FIELDS**

Research Fields: Political Economy, Microeconomic Theory, Experimental Economics  
Teaching Fields: Microeconomics, Political Economy, Mathematics for Economists,  
Formal (Political) Theory

### **TEACHING & RESEARCH EXPERIENCE**

Research Assistant, Prof. Wooyoung Lim (Hong Kong U of Science & Technology), Fall 2011  
Teaching Assistant, Game Theory, Spring 2011, U of Pittsburgh  
Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomics, Spring 2010, U of Pittsburgh

Teaching Assistant, Labor Economics, Fall 2010, Fall 2009, Spring 2009, U of Pittsburgh  
Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Macroeconomics, Spring 2011, U of Pittsburgh  
Teaching Assistant, Intro to Microeconomics, Summer 2011, Summer 2010, Fall 2008, Fall 2007,  
U of Pittsburgh  
Teaching Assistant, Intro to Macroeconomics, Spring 2008, U of Pittsburgh

## CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

*Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting Mechanisms: An Experimental Study*

Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society, Seoul, Korea, August 13, 2011

The 22nd International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, July 15, 2011

North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, June 10, 2011

Midwest Political Science Association Annual National Conference, Chicago, March 31, 2011

*Policy Divergence with Post-Electoral Bargaining*

The 10th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Shanghai, China, August 17, 2010

Midwest Political Science Association Annual National Conference, Chicago, April 22, 2010

Midwest Economic Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, March 20, 2010

Microeconomic Theory Brown-Bag Seminar, U of Pittsburgh, September 29, 2009

The 20th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, July 13, 2009

## RESEARCH GRANTS

National Science Foundation grant # SES 1123914 (Co-PI: John Duffy),

“Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting  
Mechanisms: An Experimental Study,” August 2011-July 2013

## HONORS AND AWARDS

Travel Grant for the Asian Meeting, Econometric Society, 2011

Robert W. Meyer Award, U of Pittsburgh, 2011

A&S Graduate Summer Fellowship, U of Pittsburgh, 2011, 2010

A&S GSO Travel Grants, U of Pittsburgh, 2011, 2010

GPSA Travel Grants, U of Pittsburgh, 2011, 2010

Travel Grant for the 10th World Congress, Econometric Society, 2010

A&S PBC and Alumni Travel Fellowship, U of Pittsburgh, 2010, 2009

A&S Teaching Fellowship, U of Pittsburgh, 2007-2011

Faculty of Arts and Sciences Fellowship, U of Pittsburgh, 2006-2007

## WORKING PAPERS

- **Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting Mechanisms: An Experimental Study** (Job Market Paper 1) (with Sourav Bhattacharya and John Duffy)

ABSTRACT: This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment designed to study the impact of voting mechanisms on the sincerity of voting decisions and on voter participation. The set-up is a Condorcet jury model in which individuals have common interest but have noisy private information

regarding the true, binary state of nature. The jury's choice is decided by majority rule. In this setting we study two different voting mechanisms: (1) compulsory voting, where all voters are required to vote, and (2) voluntary voting, where each voter may independently choose to vote or to abstain. In the latter case, we also consider whether voting is costly or not. The theoretical literature predicts that under compulsory voting, rational voters will, in certain circumstances, vote *strategically* against their private information regarding the true state of nature. By contrast, under voluntary voting, voters who choose to vote are predicted to vote sincerely, according to their private information with endogenously determined participation rates. We find strong support in the data that the subjects do understand the incentives implied by different voting mechanisms and play according to the corresponding equilibria.

- **Policy Divergence with Post-Electoral Bargaining** (Job Market Paper 2)

ABSTRACT: We study a spatial model of two party (leftist vs. rightist) political competition over one-dimensional policy space. In a departure, our model assumes that the final policy outcome is determined not by the winner's electoral platform but by a bargaining process between the winning party and his opponent. We consider a simple bargaining protocol in which the winner must give the loser a policy concession, proportional to the latter's bargaining power or vote share. In particular, the amount of policy concession is assumed to be an increasing function of the losing party's vote share. When the latter party can obtain relatively large concession with a given vote share, the parties have to announce extremely divergent platforms at any symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. If the bargaining environment doesn't allow a sufficiently large amount of concession, then there may not exist a pure equilibrium, but mixed equilibrium can still be shown to exist. We finally establish the existence of a mixed equilibrium with continuous density strategies where two parties mix over separate sets of policies.

## WORK IN PROGRESS

- **A Laboratory Study of Information Acquisition by Heterogeneous Voters** (with Sourav Bhattacharya and John Duffy)

ABSTRACT: We Study two-state and two-alternative voting in which individuals should make a decision whether to acquire costly information about the true state of nature prior to participation and voting decisions. Voters are assumed to agree with which one is correct outcome, but to differ in the amount of loss from incorrect decisions. In this setup, voters are predicted to exhibit various ideological behaviors according to their payoff types. Namely, *strong supporters* never acquire information, but vote for a fixed alternative; *weak supporters* do acquire information, but use it (rather than abstain) only when the information supports her preferred alternative; *independents* always acquire information and vote informatively; and *abstainers* always abstain without acquiring information. We experimentally investigate the optimal investment in and use of costly information by the subjects with artificially generated types.

LANGUAGE

Korean: Native

English: Fluent

Last updated: November 13, 2011